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Abstract 
Influence diagrams serve as a powerful tool 
for modelling symmetric decision problems. 
When solving an influence diagram we de­
termine a set of strategies for the decisions 
involved. A strategy for a decision variable 
is in principle a function over its past. How­
ever, some of the past may be irrelevant for 
the decision, and for computational reasons it 
is important not to deal with redundant vari­
ables in the strategies. We show that current 
methods (e.g. the Decision Bayes-ball algo­
rithm [Shachter, 1998]) do not determine the 
relevant past, and we present a complete al­
gorithm. 
Actually, this paper takes a more general out­
set: When formulating a decision scenario as 
an influence diagram, a linear temporal or­
dering of the decisions variables is required. 
This constraint ensures that the decision sce­
nario is well defined. However, the structure 
of a decision scenario often yields certain de­
cisions conditionally independent, and it is 
therefore unnecessary to impose a linear tem­
poral ordering on the decisions. In this paper 
we deal with partial influence diagrams i.e. 
influence diagrams with only a partial tem­
poral ordering specified. We present a set of 
conditions which are necessary and sufficient 
to ensure that a partial influence diagram is 
welldefined. These conditions are used as a 
basis for the construction of an algorithm for 
determining whether or not a partial influ­
ence diagram is welldefined. 
ical modelling is an appealing way to think of and com­
municate on the underlying structure of the domain in 
question, but it also helps the modeller to focus on 
structure rather than calculations. I nfluence diagmms 
(ID) serve as a powerful modelling tool for symmet­
ric decision problems with several decisions. However, 
IDs require a linear temporal ordering of the decisions, 
and this is often felt as an unnecessary constraint. 
E.g. if no information is gathered between two deci­
sions, then these decisions can be taken independently 
of each other. This type of very obvious temporal in­
dependence can be handled by a computer system, but 
temporal independence may be more complicated. For 
example, observing a variable A immediately before 
taking a decision D need not have any impact on this 
particular decision. Hence, we look for an operational 
characterization of temporal independence in IDs. 
The advantages of having an operational charac­
terization of temporal independence are twofold. 
To take the most obvious advantage first. When 
a computer system solves an ID it basicly elimi­
nates the variables in reverse temporal order (see 
[Shachter, 1986], [Shenoy, 1992], [Jensen et al., 1994] 
and [Zhang, 1998]); eliminating a variable produces 
a table (function) over all non-eliminated neighbours. 
However, the reverse temporal order of elimination has 
a tendency to create very large tables (usually much 
larger than for Bayesian networks of the same com­
plexity). Thus, if we could relax the temporal order 
to a partial order, we would have more freedom when 
looking for a good elimination sequence. To say it an­
other way. When a decision variable D is eliminated 
we create a strategy for D given its past. If we can 
reduce the past to contain only the variables required 
for taking that decision, we have reduced the domain 
for the strategy function. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The second advantage has to do with the modelling 
process. That is, will we allow two decisions to be 
taken independently of each other? Or, do we allow 
an observation to be made independently of a certain Graphical modelling for decision support systems is 
getting more and more widespread. F irst of all, graph-
decision? Hence, we work with partial specifications of 
IDs, and would therefore like to know whether or not 
this partial structure is ambiguous, and if it is ambigu­
ous we would like the system to give suggestions for 
further specification of the temporal order. An unam­
biguous partial influence diagram is said to represent 
a welldefined decision scenario. 
In this paper we give ·a set of operational rules for 
determining whether or not a partial influence diagram 
represents a welldefined decision scenario. These rules 
are used as a basis for an algorithm for answering this 
question. The algorithm can furthermore be used in a 
dialogue between computer and user to pinpoint how 
to change the model in order to make it unambiguous. 
In section 2 we formally introduce IDs, and the terms 
and notations used throughout this paper. In section 3 
we define a partial ID as a generalization of the tradi­
tional ID, and we give a semantic as well as a syntactic 
characterization of conditions ensuring that a partial 
influence diagram is unambiguous. 
2 INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
An ID can be seen as a belief network augmented 
with decision variables and utility functions. Thus, 
the nodes in the ID can be partitioned into three dis­
joint subsets; chance nodes, decision nodes and value 
nodes. 
The chance nodes (drawn as circles) correspond to 
chance variables, and represent events which are not 
under the direct control of the decision maker. The 
decision nodes (drawn as squares) correspond to deci­
sion variables and represent actions under the direct 
control of the decision maker. In the remainder of 
this section we assume a total ordering of the decision 
nodes, indicating the order in which the decisions are 
made.1 Furthermore, we will use the concept of node 
and variable interchangeably if this does not introduce 
any inconsistency, and we assume that no barren nodes 
are specified by the ID since they have no impact on 
the decisions. 2 
The set of value nodes (drawn as diamonds) defines a 
set of utility functions, indicating the local utility for 
a given configuration of the variables in their domain. 
The total utility is the sum or the product of the local 
utilities; in the remainder of this paper we assume that 
the total utility is the sum of the local utilities. 
1 The ordering of the decision nodes is traditionally rep­
resented by a directed path which includes all decision 
nodes. 
2 A chance node or a decision node is said to be barren if 
it does not precede any other node, or if all its descendants 
are barren. 
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With each chance variable and decision variable X we 
associate a state space W x which denotes the set of 
possible outcomes/decision alternatives for X. For a 
set U' of variables we define the state space as Wu' = 
x{WxiX E U'}. 
The uncertainty associated with each chance variable 
A is represented by a conditional probability function 
P(AIPA) : WAuPA -t [0; 1], where PA denotes the 
immediate predecessors of A. 
The arcs in an ID can be partitioned into three dis­
joint subsets, corresponding to the type of node they 
go into. Arcs into value nodes represent functional 
dependencies by indicating the domain of the associ­
ated utility function. Arcs into chance nodes, denoted 
dependency arcs, represent probabilistic dependencies, 
whereas arcs into decision nodes, denoted informa­
tional arcs, imply information precedence; if there is 
an arc from a node X to a decision node D then the 
state of X is known when decision D is made. 
Let Uc be the set of chance variables and let Un = 
{ D1, D2, . . .  , Dn} be the set of decision variables. As­
suming that the decision variables are ordered by 
index, the set of informational arcs induces a par­
titioning of Uc into a collection of disjoint subsets 
C0, C1, . . .  , Cn. The set Ci denotes the chance vari­
ables observed between decision Dj and Dj+! thus, 
the variables in Cj occur as immediate predecessors of 
Dj+!· This induces a partial order-< on U = Uc UUn 
i.e. Co -< D1 -< C1 -< · · · -< Dn -< Cn 
The set of variables known to the decision maker when 
deciding on D j is called the informational predeces­
sors of Dj and is denoted pred(Dj). Assuming "no­
forgetting" the set pred(Dj) corresponds to the set of 
variables that occur before Di under -<. Moreover, 
based on the "no-forgetting" assumption we can as­
sume that an ID does not specify any redundant no­
forgetting arcs i.e. a chance node can be an immediate 
predecessor of at most one decision node. 
2.1 EVALUATION 
When evaluating an ID we identify a strategy for the 
decision variables; a strategy can be seen as a prescrip­
tion of responses to earlier observations and decisions. 
The evaluation is usually performed according to the 
maximum expected utility principle, which states that 
we should always choose an alternative that maximizes 
the expected utility. 
Definition 1. Let 'I be an ID and let Un denote the 
decision variables in 'I. A strategy is a set of functions 
� = {6niD E Un}, where 6n is a decision function 
given by: 
tln: Wpred(D) -t Wn, 
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A strategy that maximizes the expected utility is 
termed an optimal strategy. 
In general, the optimal strategy for a decision variable 
Dk in an ID I is given by: 
8v.(Co,D1, ... ,Ck-1) = 
arg max "' P(CkiCo, D1, ... , Ck-1, Dk)Pv•+• (1) v. � c. 
where pv.+t is the maximum expected utility function 
for decision Dk+l: 
PD•+•(Co,D1,··· ,Ck) = 
max L P(Ck+!ICo, D1, ... , ck, Dk+l)PDk+, D1o+1 
C�o+l 
By continuously expanding Equation 1, we get the fol­
lowing expression for the optimal strategy for D k: 
where 1/J1, . . .  1/Jl are the utility functions specified by 
I. 
The expression above conveys that the variables are 
to be eliminated w.r.t. an elimination sequence which 
is consistent with the partial order, and in what fol­
lows we define a legal elimination sequence as a bijec­
tion a : U B {1, 2, . . .  , lUI}, where X -< Y implies 
a(X) < a(Y). Note that a legal elimination sequence 
is not necessarily unique, since the chance variables 
in the sets Ci can be commuted. Even so, any two 
legal elimination sequences result in the same optimal 
strategy since the decision variables are ordered totally 
and 'I:' operations commute; the total ordering of the 
decision variables ensures that the relative elimination 
order for any pair of variables of opposite type is in­
variant under the legal elimination sequences (this is 
needed since a 'max' operation and a 'I:' operation 
do not commute in general). 
3 REPRESENTING DECISION 
PROBLEMS UNAMBIGUOUSLY 
In the section above we described the evaluation of 
an ID w.r.t. the maximum expected utility principle. 
The underlying assumption was a total ordering of the 
decision variables ensuring that the optimal strategy 
is independent of the legal elimination sequences. 
However, it is in general not necessary to have a to­
tal ordering of the decision variables (if ck = 0 then 
Dk and Dk+1 can be commuted). This can also be 
seen from the optimal strategy for a decision variable 
(equation 1), where the elimination order for any two 
adjacent variables of opposite type may be permuted 
if the variables do not occur in the same function. 
3.1 PARTIAL INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
AND DECISION SCENARIOS 
Given that a total ordering of the decision variables 
may not be needed, we define a partial influence dia­
gram (PID) as a directed acyclic graph consisting of 
decision nodes, chance nodes and value nodes, assum­
ing that value nodes have no children. Notice, that 
chance nodes may have several decision nodes as im­
mediate successors, and that no ordering is imposed on 
the decisions. Additionally, we define a realization of a 
PID as an attachment of functions to the appropriate 
variables i.e. the chance variables are associated with 
conditional probability functions and the value nodes 
are associated with utility functions. 
Since the semantics of a PID correspond to the seman­
tics of an ID, a PID induces a partial order -< on the 
nodes Uc U Uv, as defined by the transitive closure of 
the following relation (see figure 1): 
• Y-< D;, if (Y,D;) is a directed arc ini (D; E Uv). 
• D; -< Y, if (D;, X1, X2, ... , Xm, Y) is a directed 
path in I (Y E Uc U Uv and D; E Uv). 
• D; -< A, if A f< Dj for all Di E Uv (A E Uc and 
D; E Uv). 
• D; -< A, if A f< D; and �Di E Uv s.t. D; -< Di 
and A-< Di (A E Uc and D; E Uv). 
In what follows we say that two different nodes X and 
Y in a PID I are incompatible if X f< Y and Y f< X. 
Note that a chance node A is incompatible with a de­
cision node D if there exists a decision node D' s.t. 
D and D' are incompatible and (A, D') is an informa­
tional arc in I and A¢ pred(D)(see figure 1). 
As for the traditional ID we seek to identify an opti­
mal strategy when evaluating a PID. Since the optimal 
strategy for a decision variable may be dependent on 
variables observed, we define a total order < for a PID. 
Definition 2. Let I be a PID and let U = Uv U Uc 
denote the set of decision variables and chance vari­
ables contained in I. A total ordering of I is a bijec­
tion j3 : U B {1, 2, . . .  , lUI}. A total ordering of I is 
said to be an admissible total ordering if X -< Y im­
plies that j3(X) < j3(Y), where -< is the partial order 
induced by I. 
In what follows <(J will denote the total ordering j3 
s.t. X <(! Y if j3(X) < j3(Y) (the index j3 will be 
Figure 1: The figure represents a PID which specifies 
the partial order {B}-< D1-< {E, F,G, D2, D4}-< C4, 
{B} -< D1-< {E,F} -< D2-< C4, {B} -< D1 -< {G} -< 
D4 -< C4 and D3 -< C4 (C4 denotes the chance vari­
ables observed (possibly never) after deciding on all 
the decisions). Thus, D2, D3 and D4 are pairwise in­
compatible, whereas D1 and D4 are not. Furthermore, 
it can be seen that F is incompatible with D4. 
omitted if this does not introduce any confusion). E.g. 
E < F < D2 < B < D1 < G < D4 < D3 < C4 is 
a total ordering of the PID in figure 1, but it is not 
admissible since it contradicts D1 -< D2. 
Notice, that an admissible total ordering of a PID I 
implies that I can be seen as an ID (assuming that 
redundant no-forgetting arcs have been removed). 
Based on the informational predecessors for a decision 
variable, we define a strategy relative to a total order 
<, as a set of functions �< = {6.l3!D E Un}, where 613 
is a decision function given by: 
813: Wpred(D)< --+ Wn, 
where pred( D)< = {XIX < D} ( the index < in 
pred(D)< will be omitted if this does not introduce 
any confusion). Given a realization of a PID I, we 
term a strategy relative to <, an optimal strategy rela­
tive to < if the strategy maximizes the expected utility. 
Likewise we term a decision function 8.!3 contained in 
an optimal strategy relative to <, an optimal strategy 
for D relative to <. Note that an optimal strategy for 
a decision variable D relative to < does not necessar­
ily depend on all the variables observed. Hence we say 
that an observed variable X is required for D w.r.t. < 
if there is a realization of I s.t. the optimal strategy 
for D relative to < is dependent on the state of X. 
Since a total order for a PID need not be admissible, 
we define an admissible optimal strategy for a realiza­
tion of a PID as an optimal strategy relative to an 
admissible total order. 
Definition 3. A realization of a PID I is said to de­
fine a decision scenario if all admissible optimal strate­
gies for I are identical. A PID is said to define a de­
cision scenario if all its realizations define a decision 
scenario. 
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The above definition characterizes the class of PIDs 
which can be considered welldefined, since the set of 
admissible total orderings for an PID I can be seen 
as the legal elimination sequences for I (Note that the 
traditional ID defines a decision scenario). Moreover, 
in correspondence with the permutations of chance 
variables in any legal elimination sequence for an ID, 
we define the following relation for any admissible total 
order. 
Definition 4. Let< be an admissible total order, and 
let X and Y be two neighbouring variables under <, 
fulfilling one of the following three conditions: 
• X and Y are both chance variables. 
• X and Y are both decision variables. 
• X and Y are incompatible. 
The ordering <1 obtained from < by permuting X 
and Y according to the rules above is said to be C­
equivalent with<, denoted< =c <1• 
Proposition 1. The transitive closure of =c is an 
equivalence relation. 
Theorem 1. All admissible orderings of a partial or­
der -< are C-equivalent. 
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the following claim: Let 
< be an admissible total ordering, and let X and Y be 
incompatible s.t. X < Y. Then the ordering obtained 
from < by permuting X and Y is C-equivalent with 
<. 
Assume the claim not to be true. Then there exists an 
admissible total ordering < and a pair of incompatible 
variables X, Y which can not be permuted. Let X 
and Y be such that the segment between X and Y 
under < is minimal. That is, it is not possible to find 
any other admissible total order with an incompatible 
non-permutable pair of variables closer than X andY 
under<: 
X < X1 < · · · < Xn < Y 
Now, start with X and follow < until we reach an in­
compatible variable X;; we know that at least when 
we reach Y we will meet an incompatible variable. If 
X; = Y then Y and X;-1 can be permuted, and we 
have an admissible ordering with an incompatible non­
permutable pair closer than the closest. If i :S n then 
X and X; are incompatible. If they can not be per­
muted we have a pair of incompatible non-permutable 
variables closer than the closest. If they can be per­
muted we also obtain a closer pair. 0 
So, we are looking for a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions ensuring that all admissible orderings yield 
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the same set of strategies. Actually, we will look for 
conditions ensuring that orderings, C-equivalent with 
an admissible ordering, yield the same strategies; this 
is a bit broader as we allow permutation of two neigh­
bouring decision variables. From Theorem 1 we in­
fer that we can narrow down the scope to neighbour­
ing variables of opposite type (in general neighbour­
ing variables of opposite type can not be permuted 
without affecting the strategies). Hence, we look for a 
necessary and sufficient set of conditions granting com­
mutation of two incompatible neighbouring variables 
of opposite type. 
Definition 5. Let I be a PID and let A be a chance 
variable incompatible with a decision variable D in I. 
Then A is said to be significant for D if there is a 
realization and an admissible total order < for I s.t. 
• A occurs immediately before D under <. 
• The optimal strategy for D relative to < is differ­
ent from the one achieved by permuting A and D 
in<. 
A chance variable is said to be significant for D relative 
to < if the above conditions are satisfied w.r.t. <. 
Notice that if a chance variable A is significant for D 
w.r.t. < then A is required for D w.r.t. <. 
Based on the above definitions we present the following 
theorem which characterizes the constraints necessary 
and sufficient for a PID to define a decision scenario. 
Theorem 2. The PID I defines a decision scenario if 
and only if for each decision variable D there does not 
exist a chance variable A significant for D. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 1 and Def­
inition 5. 0 
So, we have reduced the task to the following: Let I 
be a PID, and let A be a chance variable incompatible 
with a decision variable D. Is A significant for D? 
[Shachter, 1998) presents an algorithm for determining 
the so called requisite information for a decision vari­
able in an ID. Unfortunately, the algorithm does not 
meet our needs as shown by the following example. 
Example 1. When running the algorithm Decision 
Bayes-ball[Shachter, 1998) on the ID depicted in fig­
ure 2, the chance variable B is marked as requisite for 
decision D1. However, B is not relevant for the opti­
mal strategy for D1, i.e. the elimination order of B 
relative to D1 is of no importance when considering 
the optimal strategy for D1. 
0 
Figure 2: The algorithm Decision Bayes-ball marks 
the chance variable B as requisite for D1. 
The following method, which corresponds to itera,. 
tively replacing decisions by their strategies, has the 
same drawback. For an ID we start off with the moral 
graph i.e. informational arcs are removed, undirected 
arcs are added between nodes with a common child 
and finally, value nodes are removed together with the 
directions on the arcs. When eliminating a decision 
variable D the resulting set of neighbours N (D) is a 
subset of pred(D). This set of neighbours is invariant 
w.r.t. the legal elimination sequences, and it is charac­
terized as the set of variables connected in the moral 
graph to D through a path with no intermediate vari­
able in pred(D). As N(D) contains all the information 
relevant for determining the optimal strategy for D, it 
is a candidate for the relevant past. However N(D) 
may contain variables insignificant for D as can be 
seen from the ID depicted in Figure 2; B is contained 
in the neighbouring set for D1 as the elimination of A 
produces a fill-in between B and D1. 
So, neither Decision Bayes-ball nor the elimination 
method presented above is fine-grained enough to de­
tect all independencies. The problem is that N(D) 
may contain variables relevant for the maximum ex­
pected utility for D; the maximum expected utility 
for D may cover utility functions having no influence 
on the optimal strategy for D. This means that we 
need to characterize and identify the utility functions 
on which the optimal strategy for D depends. 
Definition 6. The utility function '1/J is relevant for 
D w.r.t. the admissible total order < for I, if there 
exists two realizations R1 and R2 of I who only differ 
on '1/J s.t. the optimal strategies for D relative to < are 
different in R1 and R2. 
We need to determine the structural constraints neces­
sary and sufficient for a utility function to be relevant 
for a decision variable, and based on this character­
ization we shall define the constraints necessary and 
sufficient for a chance variable to be significant for a 
given decision variable. 
3.2 RELEVANT UTILITY FUNCTIONS­
EXAMPLES AND RULES 
The optimal strategy for a decision variable D is based 
on the assumption that we always adhere to the max­
imum expected utility principle. Hence, if deciding on 
D can influence a future decision D' then the utility 
functions relevant for D' may be relevant for D also. 
From this observation together with the expression for 
the optimal strategy for D (see equation 1), we present 
the following metarules. For notational convenience 
we shall sometimes treat uninstantiated decision nodes 
as chance nodes with an even prior distribution. More­
over, since a utility function is termed relevant w.r.t. 
an admissible total order we will mainly consider IDs 
in the section. 
Metarule 1. 1/J is relevant for D in I if there is a real­
ization of I s.t. D has an impact on the expected 
utility for 7/J. 
Metarule 2. 1/J is relevant for D in I if there is a 
realization of I and a future decision D' s.t. D 
has an impact on D', for which 1/J is relevant. 
Metarule 3. If none of the metarules above can be 
applied then 1/J is not relevant for D. 
The following examples present a set of IDs where we 
identify the utility functions relevant for a given de­
cision variable. The properties relating to these ex­
amples will be generalized to arbitrary IDs, which will 
serve as a basis for determining the structural con­
straints necessary for a utility function to be relevant 
for a given decision variable. 
Example 2. Consider the ID depicted in figure 3 and 
assume that the conditional probability functions are 
specified s. t. the state of a variable corresponds to the 
state of its parent. 
Figure 3: The figure represents an ID, where the utility 
function 1/J is relevant for the decision variable D. 
It is easy to specify two realizations of 1/J s.t. the op­
timal strategies relative to those realizations differ i.e. 
1/J is relevant for D1. 0 
Now, assume an arbitrary ID I in which there exists 
a directed path from a decision node D to a value 
node 1/J (excluding informational arcs), and assume a 
realization R of I. Since the conditional probability 
functions associated with the variables on the path 
from D to 1/J can be specified s.t. deciding on D has an 
impact on the expected utility for 1/J, it follows that 1/J 
is relevant for D. 
Rule 1. Let I be a PID, and let f denote I without 
informational arcs. The utility function 1/J is relevant 
for the decision variable D if there exists a directed 
path from D to 1/J in I. 
This rule is equivalent to Metarule 1, as can be 
seen from the mathematical expression correspond­
ing to this metarule: 1/J is relevant for D if 
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Table 1: The utility function 7j;'(C,D4). 
10 0 
0 9 
P(dom(7/J)ID, pred(D)) is a function of D, where 
dom( 1/J) is the chance variables in the domain of 
'1/J ( uninstantiated decision variables are treated as 
chance variables). The conditional probability func­
tion P(dom(7/J)Ipred(D), D) is a function of D if D is 
d-connected to a variable A E dom(¢) given pred(D). 
However, this implies that there exists a directed path 
from D to 7/J in f. Conversely, if there exists a di­
rected path from D to 1/J in f, then D is d-connected 
to a variable A E dom('I/J) given pred(D). 
The following examples illustrate, that in order to 
identify all the utility functions relevant for a given 
decision variable D, it is in general not sufficient only 
to consider those utility functions to which there exist 
a directed path from D. 
Example 3. When deciding on D4 in the ID depicted 
in Figure 4 we want to maximize 7/J'. Now, as the deci­
sion variable D2 is d-connected to C given pred(D4), 
it follows that the decision made w.r.t. D2 may change 
our belief in C (when deciding on D4) and thereby in­
fluence D4 through 7/J' (D2 is required for D4). Hence 
'1/J' is relevant for D2, which is also true for 1/J as 
Dz E dom(7j;). Moreover, knowledge of A may like­
wise change our belief in C when deciding on D4, and 
since A is influenced by D1 it follows that D1 has an 
impact on D2 since knowledge of D1 can be taken into 
account when deciding on D2 (D1 is required for D2). 
Thus, 7/J' is relevant for both D1 and D2 conveying 
that '1/J is relevant for D1 also. 
Figure 4: The figure represents an ID where both 1/J 
and '1/J' are relevant for D1. 
This can also be seen by considering the utility func­
tion specified by table 1 together with the functions 
P(C) = (0, 5; 0, 5), 'I/J1(D2) = (0; 3) and 7f;2(D2) = 
(3; 0) (we assume that the state of A corresponds to 
the state of D1 and that P(BID2, A, C) is specified s.t. 
the state of C is revealed if the state of A, B and D2 
are the same, and no knowledge is gained on C if this 
is not the case). 
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These functions define two realizations of I who only 
differ on '1/J, and when evaluating I w.r.t. these real­
izations we obtain two different optimal strategies for 
D1 i.e. 8n, = d1 if '1/J = '1/JJ and 8n, = d2 if 'ljJ = 'I/J2· 
From these strategies it can be seen that the utility 
function 'ljJ influences the optimal strategy for D1 i.e. 
'1/J is relevant for D1. 0 
The example above can be seen as an instance of 
Metarule 2. Assume an arbitrary ID I and a realiza­
tion of I in which the conditional probability function 
for any intermediate variable in a converging connec­
tion is as specified in the example above. From this 
structure we may deduce that, if '1/J' is relevant for a 
future decision D' and D is required for D', then the 
utility function '1/J' is relevant for D; D has an impact 
anD'. 
Example 4. When deciding on D4 in the ID depicted 
in figure 5, we seek to maximize '1/J'. By the arguments 
given in the example above, it follows that both '1/J and 
'1/J' are relevant for D2. Additionally, knowledge of B 
may change our belief in E when deciding on D4, and 
since B is influenced by A, which in turn is influenced 
by D1 , it follows that D1 has an impact on D2 (A is 
required for D2). Thus, both 'ljJ and '1/J' are relevant for 
DJ. 
Figure 5: The figure represents a ID, in which D1 may 
influence the chance variable A required for D2, indi­
cating that both '1/J and '1/J' are relevant for D1. 
This can also be seen by assuming the two realizations 
consisting of the utility functions 'I/J1 (D2) = (0; 3) and 
?jJ2(D2) = (3; 0) together with functions corresponding 
to the ones specified in Example 2 and Example 3. 
When evaluating I w.r.t. these realizations we obtain 
two optimal strategies which differ on D1 i.e. 8n, = 
d1 if '1/J = ?/J1 and 8n, = d2 if 'ljJ = ?/J2- From these 
strategies it can be seen that the utility function 'ljJ 
may influence the optimal strategy for D1 i.e. 'ljJ is 
relevant for D1 . 0 
The structural properties relating to the example 
above can, as for the previous example, be general­
ized to an arbitrary ID. Thus, based on the example 
above and the deductions made w.r.t. Example 3, we 
present the following rule. 
Rule 2. Let I be a P ID and let < be an admissible 
total order for I. The utility function 'ljJ is relevant 
for the decision variable D w. r. t. < if there exists a 
decision variable D' s. t. 
i) D < D' and 'ljJ is relevant forD' w.r.t. <. 
ii) either 
a) D is required forD' w.r.t. < or 
b) there exists a directed path in f from D to 
a chance variable X E pred(D'), and X is 
required forD' w.r.t. <. 
This rule is equivalent to Metarule 2, since the rule 
covers all the cases where D can have an impact on 
a future decision D'; D has an impact on D' if and 
only if D is required for D' or D influences a variable 
required for D'. 
Note that Rule 2 is not a complete structural rule as 
it refers to the term "required", which has not yet 
been characterized structurally. This is done in the 
following section. 
3.3 REQUIRED VARIABLES­
EXAMPLES AND RULES 
Having established a method to identify the utility 
functions relevant for a decision variable, one might 
think that the required variables could be identified 
in the following way: Before constructing the moral 
graph, remove all utility functions not relevant for 
D and then eliminate the variables as described in 
Section 3.1. However, the resulting neighbouring set 
N (D) may still contain variables which are not re­
quired as can be seen from Figure 8: if we add the 
arc (A, D) and remove the arc (D"','I/J) then A is not 
required for D but A E N(D) when D is eliminated. 
A variable X is required for a decision variable D if X 
is observed before D and the state of X may influence 
the optimal strategy for D. Since the optimal strategy 
for D is dependent on the assumption that we always 
adhere to the maximum expected utility principle it 
follows that X is required for D if X has an impact on 
D or X has an impact on a future decision variable D', 
on which D also has an impact. Hence, analogously 
to the metarules specifying the utility functions rele­
vant for a decision variable, we present three metarules 
concerning the variables required for a given decision 
variable; according to the definition of a required vari­
able we assume an admissible total order < where a 
variable X occurs before a decision variable D under 
<. 
Metarule 4. X is required for D if there is a real­
ization s.t. when deciding on D the state of X 
has an impact on the expected utility for a utility 
function 'ljJ relevant for D w.r.t. <. 
Metarule 5. X is required for D if there is a realiza­
tion and a future decision D' s.t. X has an impact 
on D', and there exists a utility function 1/J rele­
vant for both D and D' w.r.t. <. 
Metarule 6. If none of the metarules above can be 
applied then X is not required for D. 
The following examples present a set of PIDs in which 
some of the required variables are identified. The prop­
erties described by these examples will be generalized 
to arbitrary PIDs, and they will serve as a basis for 
a theorem describing the structural constraints nec­
essary and sufficient for a variable to be required for 
a given decision variable. In the examples we assume 
that chance variables, with no immediate predecessors, 
are given an even prior distribution. 
Example 5. Consider the PID I depicted in figure 6. 
The utility function 1/J is relevant for D for any admis­
sible total ordering of I, and since 1/J is functionally 
dependent on the chance variable A it follows that A 
is required for D; as A is incompatible with D there is 
an admissible total order < with A< D. 
Figure 6: The figure represents a PID in which the 
chance variable A is required for D. 
0 
The example above can be generalized to an arbitrary 
PID I, assuming that I contains a decision variable D 
and a variable X. If there exists an admissible total 
order < s.t. X occurs before D under < and X is d­
connected to a utility function 1/J, relevant for D w.r.t. 
<, given pred(D), then X is required for D; we can 
specify a realization of I s.t. the state of X has an 
impact on the expected utility for 1/J. 
Rule 3. Let I be a P ID and let D be a decision vari­
able in I. The variable X is required for D if there 
exists a utility function 1/J relevant forD w.r.t. an ad­
missible total order < s. t. X occurs before D under < 
and X is d-connected to 1/J given pred(D). 
This rule is equivalent to Metarule 4, as can be seen by 
expressing the metarule mathematically: X is required 
for D if P(dom( 1/J) [D, pred(D)) is a function of X, and 
1/J is a utility function relevant for D. The probability 
function P(dom('I/J)[D, pred(D)) is a function of X if 
and only if X is d-connected to 1/J given pred(D). 
The following examples show, that in order to identify 
all the variables required for a decision variable D, it is 
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in general not sufficient only to consider the variables 
which directly influence the decision made w.r.t. D 
(see Metarule 5). 
Example 6. In the PID I depicted in figure 7 the 
chance variable A may be observed before D. More­
over, A is required for D" since 1/J is relevant for D" 
and A is d-connected to 1/J given pred(D"). Now, since 
1/J is relevant for D also, it follows that if D < D" then 
A and D may both have an impact on D". Addition­
ally, if A is observed prior to D then the state of A 
can be taken into account when deciding on D i.e. A 
is required for D. 
Figure 7: The figure represents a PID in which the 
variable A is required for D. 
This can also be seen by considering the utility func­
tion specified by Table 2, assuming that P(B[A, C) 
has the properties of P(C[D2 , B , E) specified in Ex­
ample 3. 
Table 2: The utility function 1/J(D, C, D"). 
The optimal strategy for D relative to 
A,D,D',B,D",C is given by 8n(a1) = d2 and 
8n(a2) = d1 which indicate, that D is dependent on 
the state of A (A is required for D). 0 
In the example above, the conditional probability func­
tion for B is specified s.t. the state of C is revealed if 
the state of A corresponds to the state of B, and no 
knowledge is gained on C if the state of A does not 
correspond to the state of B. Furthermore, the utility 
function 1/J relevant for both D and D" is specified s.t. 
the state of C and the decision made w.r.t. D influ­
ences D". Thus, A is required for D" and therefore 
required for D also. 
Analogously to the previous examples, we may gener­
alize this example by considering an arbitrary PID I 
and an admissible total order for I, where a variable X 
occurs before a decision variable D and X is required 
for a future decision D', which has a relevant utility 
function in common with D. By specifying the real­
ization of I according to the example above, it follows 
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that the state of X may influence the decision made 
w.r.t. D'. Moreover, since D and D' have a relevant 
utility function in common and X is required for D' 
we have that X is required for D also; the state of X 
can be taken into account when deciding on D. 
Example 7. Consider the PID I depicted in figure 8. 
Observing the chance variable A may reveal the state 
of X, and when deciding on D'" the observation of X 
may change our belief in the state of C. Now, since 
'1/J is relevant for both D and Dm the decision made 
w.r.t. D has an impact on D'", and since the state 
of A may influence the decision made w.r.t. Dm, and 
thereby the optimal strategy for D, it follows that the 
state of A is relevant when deciding on D. That is, A 
is required for D. 
Figure 8: The figure represents a PID in which the 
chance variable A is required for D. 
This can also be seen by considering a realiza­
tion of I, where P(X)A) is a deterministic func­
tion and '1/J(D, C, Dm) and P(B)X, C) correspond to 
'1/J(D, C, D") and P(A)D1 , B) respectively (see Ex­
ample 3 and Table 2). When evaluating I w.r.t. 
A,D,D',X,D",B,Dm,c the optimal strategy for D 
is given by <lv( ai) = d2 and <lv( a2) = d1 i.e. A is 
required for D. D 
In the example above, the state of X is determined by 
the state of A, whereas the state of C is determined by 
the state of X and B i.e. as for the previous examples 
the state of C is revealed if the state of X corresponds 
to the state of B, whereas no knowledge is gained on C 
if the state of X does not correspond to the state of B. 
Now, consider an arbitrary PID I, and let X denote 
a variable which occurs before the decision variable 
D under <, and assume that X is d-connected to a 
chance variable Y E pred(D') given pred(D). If Y is 
required for D'(D < D') and D' has a relevant utility 
function relevant in common with D w.r.t. <,then we 
can specify a realization, as described in the example 
above, s.t. the optimal strategy for D is dependent on 
the state of X. That is, X is required for D. 
Rule 4. Let I be a PID and let D be a decision vari­
able in I. Then the variable X is required for D if 
there exists a utility function '1/J relevant for D w. r. t. 
an admissible total order <, where X occurs before D 
and: 
i) there exists a decision variable D' (D < D') s.t. '1/J 
is relevant for D' w.r.t. <. 
ii) X is required for D' or X is d-connected to a 
chance variable Y E pred( D') given pred( D) and 
Y is required for D'. 
This rule is equivalent to Metarule 5, since the obser­
vation of X can have an impact on a future decision 
D' if and only if X is required for D' or X influences 
a variable required for D'. 
The rules 2 and 4 represent a set of simultaneous recur­
sive structural constraints. The recursion terminates 
because it moves forward in the temporal ordering for 
each "call". 
Based on the rules above we present the following theo­
rem which defines the structural constraints necessary 
and sufficient for a variable to be required for a given 
decision variable. 
Theorem 3. Let I be an PID and let D be a decision 
variable in I. Then the variable X is required for D if 
and only if Rule 3 or Rule 4 (and Rule 1 and Rule 2) 
can be applied. 
Proof. The "if" part of the proof is apparent from the 
examples above. A mathematial proof of the "only if" 
part can be performed by closely following the elimi­
nation process when solving an ID. The basic idea is 
to postpone the calculations until a maximization is 
performed in order to calculate a strategy for a deci­
sion variable. That is, instead of marginalizing out a 
chance variable a script is produced, and when maxi­
mizing, the relevant scripts are identified. The details 
may be found in [Nielsen and Jensen, 1999]. D 
Based on the previous rules we present the following 
rule characterizing the chance variables significant for 
a given decision variable; this rule is apparent from 
Rule 3 and Rule 4. 
Rule 5. Let I be an PID and let D be a decision vari­
able in I incompatibel with a chance variable A. Then 
A is significant for D if there exists a utility function 
'1/J relevant forD w.r.t. an admissible total ordering<, 
where A occurs immediately before D s.t. : 
i) A is d-connected to '1/J given pred(D) or 
ii) there exists a decision variable D'(D < D') s.t. '1/J 
is relevant for D' and: 
a) A is required for D' or 
b) A is d-connected to a chance variable X E 
pred(D') given pred(D) and X is required for 
D'. 
Additionally we have the folllowing corollaries as a 
consequence of theorem 3. 
Corollary 1. Let I be a PID and let D be a decision 
variable in I. Then the utility function '1/J is relevant 
for D if and only if Rule 1 or Rule 2 can be applied. 
Corollary 2. Let I be a PID and let D be a decision 
variable in I incompatible with the chance variable A. 
Then A is significant for D if and only if Rule 5 can 
be applied. 
Corollary 3. Let I be an ID and let D be a decision 
variable in I. Then X is required for D if and only if 
Rule 3 or Rule 4 can be applied. 
4 ALGORITHMS 
In order to determine whether or not a PID defines a 
decision scenario, it is in principle necessary to inves­
tigate all admissible total orderings < with a pair of 
incompatible variables being neighbours in <. How­
ever, the set of admissible orderings to investigate can 
be reduced substantially. E.g. if (A, D) is an incompat­
ible pair, then the ordering of the predecessors is of no 
importance. Also, if all pairs of incompatible successor 
nodes have been investigated and found commutably 
irrelevant, then we can take any admissible order of 
the successors of A and D. Thus, we start off with 
maximal pairs of incompatible pairs and work ourself 
backwards in the partial temporal ordering. 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have defined a PID as a generalization of the tradi­
tional ID by allowing a non-total ordering of the deci­
sion variables. Because the solution to a decision prob­
lem may be dependent on the temporal ordering of the 
decisions, we specified the class of PIDs whose solution 
is independent of the legal evaluation schemes i.e. the 
class of PIDs that represents a well defined decision sce­
nario. Additionally, we presented the constraints nec­
essary and sufficient for a PID to be contained in this 
class. 
The constraints were given in terms of the concept 
d-connectivity and are thus readable from the graph­
ical structure. Based on these constraints an algo­
rithm has been designed and implemented to deter­
mine whether or not a PID represents a welldefined 
decision scenario (the algorithm uses the methods in 
[Geiger et a!., 1990] to determine d-connectivity). The 
algorithm has been tested on various PIDs, including 
those from the paper. 
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